![]() ![]() ![]() Simply put, Departmental controls were not adequate to prevent and/or detect quality assurance problems. Based on an extensive examination of relevant internal controls and procurement practices, we concluded that these failures were attributable to inadequate attention to quality assurance at Savannah River. The failure of the item could have resulted in a spill of up to 15,000 gallons of high-level radioactive waste. In one of these situations, operating procedures had to be modified to ensure that the problem item did not compromise safety and (3) Finally, at the ISP, one component that did not meet quality standards was procured. These substandard items necessitated costly and time consuming remedial action to, among other things, ensure that nonconforming materials and equipment would function within safety margins (2) In six instances, items used in the construction of TEF failed to satisfy quality standards. For example: (1) Three structural components were procured and installed by the prime contractor at Savannah River during construction of the MOX Facility that did not meet the technical specifications for items relied on for safety. Specifically, we identified multiple instances in which critical components did not meet required quality and safety standards. Our review disclosed that the Department had procured and installed safety-class and safety-significant SSCs that did not meet NQA-1 quality standards. Due to the importance of protecting the public, workers, and environment, we initiated an audit to determine whether the Department of Energy procured safety-class and safety-significant SSCs that met NQA-1 standards at the Savannah River Site. Safety-significant SSCs are those whose failure could irreversibly impact worker safety such as a fatality, serious injury, or significant radiological or chemical exposure. ![]() Safety-class SSCs are defined as those necessary to prevent exposure off site and to protect the public. These requirements, promulgated by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, must be applied to 'safety-class' and 'safety-significant' structures, systems and components (SSCs). The NQA-1 standard provides requirements and guidelines for the establishment and execution of quality assurance programs during the siting, design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. The QA Order requires the application of Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications (NQA-1) for nuclear-related activities. To that end, it issued Departmental Order 414.1C, Quality Assurance (QA Order). ![]() Such standards help to ensure the safety and performance of these facilities. The Department has committed to procuring products and services for nuclear-related activities that meet more » or exceed recognized quality assurance standards. The Interim Salt Processing (ISP) project, managed by the Office of Environmental Management, will treat radioactive waste. The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOX Facility) is being constructed to manufacture commercial nuclear reactor fuel assemblies from weapon-grade plutonium oxide and depleted uranium. This includes the National Nuclear Security Administration's Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) which is designated to help maintain the reliability of the U.S. The Department of Energy operates several nuclear facilities at its Savannah River Site, and several additional facilities are under construction. This is followed by an analysis of the agreement itself leading up to a proposed framework for cooperative measures that might enhance the spirit and implementation of the agreement. It outlines the measures in place for the physical protection and safety of nuclear warheads, nuclear materials, and command and control mechanisms in the two countries, and it goes on to identify the prominent, emerging challenges posed by the introduction of new weapon technologies and modernization of the respective strategic forces. This study briefly dwells upon the strategic landscape of nuclear South Asia with the respective nuclear force management structures, doctrines, and postures of India and Pakistan. This study brings together two emerging strategic analysts from South Asia to explore measures more » to support the Agreement and further develop cooperation around this critical issue. It also rests on the hope that the region would be spared a nuclear holocaust from an accidental nuclear weapon detonation that might be misconstrued as a deliberate use of a weapon by the other side. Despite a history of mutual animosity and persistent conflict between the two countries, this agreement derives strength from a few successful nuclear confidence building measures that have stood the test of time. In 2012, India and Pakistan reaffirmed the Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |